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ABSTRACT
There is lively debate concerning the influence of development assistance (‘aid’) on corruption in
recipient countries; however, to date, few studies have systematically examined the subject sub-
nationally. This study estimates the association between sub-national aid levels and citizens’
perceptions and experiences of local corruption in Malawi. Overall, we find that individuals in
districts receiving high amounts of aid are no more likely to view local leaders as corrupt than
those in districts receiving lower amounts of aid. However, higher levels of aid are associated
with more experiences of bribe solicitation. We also find evidence that aid channeled through
NGOs may have different effects than government-implemented aid, as it is associated with
better perceptions of local corruption and reduced bribe solicitation. The findings suggest that,
in aggregate, corruption resulting from receiving aid may not be of sufficient magnitude or
visibility to change citizens’ broader beliefs about government performance or legitimacy.
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Introduction and review
This study examines the relationship between levels of
development assistance (hereafter ‘aid’) and citizens’
perceptions and experiences of local corruption in
Malawi. Corruption is an overriding concern among
those who study, fund, and implement aid projects.1
Indeed, it is rare to find a study on the economic or pol-
itical impact of aid that does not mention corruption. The
study of corruption in aid is motivated not only by a nor-
mative, moral objection to the abuse of entrusted power
in aid projects, but also by the belief that corrupt prac-
tices erode the effectiveness of aid by diverting
resources away from where they could have the most
impact. In addition, there is a well-founded concern
that corruption in public services erodes government
legitimacy and suppresses political participation in
heavily aid-dependent states.
Aid resources are thought to be particularly prone to
corruption because the allocation and implementation
of aid projects within receiving countries is largely left
to the discretion of local leaders; because these local
leaders often exercise monopolies over valuable aid
resources; and because systems of accountability for aid
programs are often weak (Klitgaard 1988). Local leaders
monopolize themanagement of aid resources at the com-
munity level. The combination of ambiguous andoverlap-
ping organizational jurisdictions, a multiplicity of project
implementers, and the great distance of donors from
aid projects impedes accountability. Donors, for their
part, have little incentive or capacity to actively monitor
projects or to punish misappropriation, largely because
of cultural ties, a desire to maintain trading relationships,
and foreign policy interests at home (Alesina and Dollar
1998; Tavares 2003; Williamson 2010).2
Although most studies of the relationship between
aid and corruption focus on national actors, it is reason-
able to assume that the potential for corruption in aid
projects is also significant at the local, community level,
where discretion is greatest. At the community level,
aid projects are usually carried out by local government
officials, national NGOs (non-governmental organiz-
ations), or community- and faith-based organizations
(CBOs), such as mission hospitals and self-help groups.
These intermediary organizations and the local leaders
that manage them are a crucial part of the ‘aid chain.’
They direct and manage a great deal of the local distri-
bution of aid resources (Bierschenk, Elwert, and
Kohnert 1993; Neubert 1996; Dionne 2012)
The centrality of these local leaders in aid projects
rests on the fact that donors, international NGOs, and,
to a lesser extent, national governments, usually lack
the cultural understanding, knowledge of the local politi-
cal context, language skills, or the physical presence
necessary to carry out projects at the community level
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(Lewis and Mosse 2006). As a result, national and inter-
national agencies depend heavily on intermediaries to
‘navigate local barriers’ for them (Swidler 2009). For com-
munity members, local leaders such as traditional leaders
and the head of CBOs therefore, act as ‘gatekeepers, con-
duits of information, and respected arbiters’, and are the
face of aid activity in the community (Dionne 2012). For
example, they decide who will serve on project commit-
tees and which community members are considered to
be ‘vulnerable’ and therefore should be targeted for
support. They may also decide where infrastructure
such as water pumps or schools should be placed.
Local leaders also organize the communal and ‘volun-
tary’ activity often required to implement these projects’
(Swidler 2010). Any blame or credit for the way in which
aid projects are managed should, therefore, accrue to
them disproportionately.
Aid and perceptions of corruption: the evidence
Over sixty years of experience with aid projects has given
us only tenuous empirical evidence that influxes of aid
resources are associated with increased corruption in
receiving communities. Anecdotal evidence of the mis-
management and misuse of development aid resources
abounds (Moyo 2009; Rayner and Swinford 2011).
Cross-national studies also provide some evidence of a
direct, positive association between aid flows and
national levels of corruption (Svensson 2000; Knack
2001), although this evidence is mixed (Alesina and
Weder 2002; Tavares 2003; Okada and Samreth 2012).
There is also cross-national evidence that aid infusions
can increase resources available for patronage, skew
incentives within social service bureaucracies, and
promote rent seeking (Brautigam 2000; Van de Walle
2001; Brautigam and Knack 2004; Harford and Klein
2005; Moss, Pettersson, and Van de Walle 2006;
Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008).
Although the scope for discretion, and therefore, cor-
ruption, is large at the community level, there are few rig-
orous sub-national studies of the relationship between
aid levels and the prevalence of community-level corrup-
tion. We have limited knowledge about the extent of cor-
ruption that results from aid projects at the community
level or how such projects are perceived by local benefi-
ciaries in regard to corruption. On the few occasions
when project beneficiaries have been surveyed in a sys-
tematic manner regarding the management of aid pro-
jects, they were found to have perceived high levels of
corruption in aid projects (Bailey 2008; Olken 2009;
Anderson, Brown, and Jean 2012). In one such study,
community members were reported to be extremely
cognizant of waste in aid projects, noting, for example,
that project money spent on workshops, travel, and
training and the ‘high salaries, expensive housing and
cars, fringe benefits, and ostentatious consumption’
could have been better spent on the direct provision
of goods and services (Anderson, Brown, and Jean
2012, 107). Overall, community members have been
found to be knowledgeable about the ways in which pro-
jects can be manipulated by local leaders for personal
gain and they are cynical about the integrity of the
CBOs that implement them.
The relationship between communities’ perceptions of
corruption and the actual prevalence of resource misap-
propriation and corruption in aid projects is unclear. In
the qualitative studies discussed above, communities’ per-
ceptions of corruption were not necessarily based on
actual experiences of corruption. Rather they seemed to
emerge from vague rumors based on ‘suspicions’ and a
feeling that ‘aid has helped too few people or accom-
plished too little given the quantity of resources they
know has been provided’ (Anderson, Brown, and Jean
2012). These community-level findings were in keeping
with empirical cross-national studies of corruption that
found only tenuous associations between national-level
citizenperceptions of corruption and the actual prevalence
of corrupt practices (Seligson 2002; Treisman 2007).3 To
summarize, in-depth qualitative studies find that regard-
less of the actual incidence of corruption in aid projects,
aid activity can generate a diffuse suspicion and a feeling
that aid resources are being misappropriated.
Case studies and evaluations of participatory, commu-
nity-based aid projects have similar findings. These
studies find that the presence of aid projects in a com-
munity is sometimes associated with increased commu-
nity tensions and conflicts over resources. For example,
in her detailed case study of HIV/AIDS care and support
organizations in peri-urban Tanzania, Jelke Boesten
(2011) found that the infusion of HIV/AIDS funding for
community-based programs into a setting of scarce
resources and insecurity increased community tensions
and led to allegations of corruption. Several rigorous,
large-scale project evaluations of community-driven
development projects have also found evidence that
aid projects can increase community discord and encou-
rage the community members to view the local leaders
as corrupt (Chase and Woolcock 2005; Barron, Woolcock,
and Diprose 2007; King, Samii, and Snilstveit 2010). While
the findings from these studies may be accurate in par-
ticular sectors and in particular points in time, their
empirical base rests almost exclusively on case studies
and evaluations of individual projects. It is therefore
unclear whether the perceptions that these individual
aid projects generate will still persist when we look at
aid activity in aggregate, over time.
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Patronage and local understandings of
corruption in Malawi
The association between the misuse of aid resources and
the perceptions of corruption in local leaders may not be
straightforward because corrupt practices intersect with,
and occur through, culturally legitimate, pre-existing
social practices. In the sub-Saharan African context,
some forms of corruption are seen as a consequence
of clientelistic political systems based on patron-client
networks and ‘informal institutions of reciprocity’
(MacLean 2011; Smith 2014). In these systems, a client
exchanges loyalty, political support, and service for per-
sonal or communal material benefits such as jobs or
food supplies from a patron.
Such patron-client interactions are understood to be
part of long-term relationships that form ongoing and
far-reaching networks of obligations, rather than being
simple one-off instrumental exchanges. These relation-
ships are deeply embedded in the social systems of
family, clan, and religious community and are bounded
by profound moral imperatives (Oliver de Sardin 1999;
Blundo and de Sardan 2006; Harrison 2006; Swidler
2009). They reflect cultural patterns rooted in the geogra-
phy and economics of African countries where ‘wealth in
people – children, wives, clients, and other dependents –
[is] the key to increasing material wealth’ i.e. where
having a network of clients has been and continues to
be important for survival (Kopytoff and Miers 1977
cited in Swidler 2009). The inability to participate in a
patron-client network, e.g. not being able to help kin
members in need, can cause deep moral crisis, and can
lead to stigmatization and retribution as well as a loss
of political and social status (Chabal and Daloz 1999;
Anders 2002; Harrison 2006; MacLean 2011; Smith
2014).4
In these settings, local practices that may look like
an abuse of power from the outside, such as nepotism
and ethnic favoritism may be construed as upholding
ones’ obligations and behaving responsibly. Local per-
ceptions of corruption may be flexible and context-
specific, depending on the relationship between the
actors involved (Sissener 2001; Blundo and de
Sardan 2006; Harrison 2006). What may drive percep-
tions of corruption in this context is not that resources
are used for unintended purposes, or that they are
distributed through informal networks, but rather
whether or not they are shared widely and equitably
within these networks (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Siss-
ener 2001; Blundo and de Sardan 2006; Smith 2007;
Smith 2014).
These varying moral understandings of corrupt prac-
tices are evident when we examine beliefs about
corruption in Malawi specifically. Historically, Malawi
has been considered to be one of the least corrupt
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This changed after Hast-
ings Banda, the former President for Life, was ousted in a
democratic transition in the mid-1990s. Both information
about corruption and the practice of corruption itself
grew due to the absence of top-down control, weak
oversight power within the newly formed political
parties, and the perceived need within the new leader-
ship to build political coalitions through the distribution
of resources (Anders 2002; Cammack, Kelsall, and Booth
2010). Banda’s regime may not have been less corrupt
than his successors’, but the type and visibility of corrup-
tion differed under his administration (Hall-Matthews
2007). Under President Muluzi, corruption scandals,
often involving government procurement, became a
recurring feature of political life as did anti-corruption
drives, heavily sponsored by external funders (Booth
et al. 2006). These anti-corruption drives intensified
under President Mutharika when they were often used
instrumentally to delegitimize and hamstring political
opponents (Hall-Matthews 2007).
Citizens in Malawi perceive high levels of corruption
across government agencies and view such practices
negatively (Khaila and Chibwana 2005; Chinsinga,
Kayuni, and Konyani 2010). Frustration with corruption,
particularly with large-scale procurement scams is a
regular topic of newspaper articles, call-in radio shows,
popular song (Hussein 2005; Chirambo 2009; Phiri
2016); and tackling corruption is a central demand in
anti-government protest (Cammack 2012). There is also
convincing evidence that disgust with President Joyce
Banda’s handling of the massive ‘Cashgate’ scandal in
which MK 20 billion was skimmed from central govern-
ment accounts played a significant role in her loss in
Malawi’s 2014 elections (Zimmerman 2015).
Despite this widespread public disapproval, anthro-
pologists studying corruption in Malawi and elsewhere
on the continent have consistently found that attitudes
about benefiting from corruption (particularly lower-
level, petty corruption) are often nuanced and ambiva-
lent. For example, in his anthropological study of corrup-
tion in Malawi’s civil service, Gehard Anders (2002) noted
that when one examined the ‘everyday language’ used
to discuss corruption in Malawi there is no ‘clear and
unequivocal rejection of practices considered to be
corrupt among average Malawians’ (12). He found that
citizens use a variety of terms to describe illegal, and
informal work practices. One, ‘katangale’, covers
‘dubious or shady’ practices linked to work including
patronage and nepotism. He states that this term has
strong, quasi-spiritual links to the idea of obligatory
sharing and reciprocity and that benefiting from
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katangale is not always considered bad; rather it might
be appropriate and in keeping with the moral order.
This term can be distinguished from ‘kuba’, theft, which
is used to describe the use of resources for one’s per-
sonal benefit with no implications of proper distribution.
In all situations, kuba is considered morally wrong.5 This
nuanced attitude may be particularly prevalent in times
of economic upheaval and in situations of pervasive cor-
ruption when official avenues to reliably access public
goods are scarce and/or closed.
Daniel Jordan Smith’s (2014) ethnographic study of
HIV/AIDS in Nigeria found similar ambivalence in staff
attitudes towards misappropriation of funds by NGO
directors. He found that when directors acted as ‘good
patrons’ who were flexible and generous to staff in
decisions about the personal use of NGO funds, they
were largely excused; in contrast, directors perceived as
using NGO funds for narrow personal gain and self-
aggrandizement were ostracized (Smith 2014).6
In addition to being modified by the socio-economic
context, this ambivalence will also vary depending on
the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents
such as age, income, gender, ethnicity, and geographic
region, reflecting not only ideological differences but
also who is systematically harmed by these networks.7
Despite these important caveats, the work of anthro-
pologists like Anders and Smith, suggests that in
countries like Malawi, ‘the attitude towards the use of
the public office for “private” ends is more complicated
and multi-layered than the state legislation and regu-
lations seem to suggest’ (Anders 2002, 14). This ambigu-
ity implies that even if aid resources fueled corruption at
the local level, local perceptions of corruption may not
increase, and may actually decrease, if resources are
widely and equitably shared.
Hypotheses
Based on the review of beneficiaries’ perceptions of aid
projects discussed above, this study performs statistical
tests using geo-coded data on sub-national aid flows
as well as survey data on public opinion about percep-
tions of corruption of government officials, in order to
explore the strength and direction of the relationship
between aid levels and perceptions and experiences of
corruption. I put forward two hypotheses:
H1: Higher levels of aid disbursements in a district will be
associated with a greater likelihood of individuals in that
district perceiving local leaders as corrupt.
H2: Higher levels of aid disbursements in a district will be
associated with a greater likelihood of individuals in that
district experiencing corruption in social services.
I have also argued that community members with strong
attachments to communitarian norms that oblige
sharing and reciprocity may view corrupt practices differ-
ently than those who do not hold such views. They may
be more judgmental than their non-communitarian
neighbors if resources are being misappropriated and
kept by a powerful few but they may also be less
prone to perceive corruption if misappropriated
resources are equally shared within patronage networks.
Because theoretically, there is no clear guidance for the
direction of the relationship between communitarian
values and perceived corruption in aid projects, and
because we do not know how equitably misappropriated
aid resources are in patronage networks, I test two
opposing hypotheses:
H3: Individuals with stronger communitarian beliefs will
be more likely to perceive corruption in local leaders as
a result of aid allocation than those with weaker beliefs.
H4: Individuals with stronger communitarian beliefs will
be less likely to perceive corruption in local leaders as
a result of aid allocation than those with weaker beliefs.
Policy relevance
Perceptions of corruption are not a trivial matter. Scho-
lars have theorized that having the perception that pol-
itical institutions are corrupt degrades overall trust in
these institutions (Rothstein 2000). Empirically, increased
perception of corruption is correlated with lower confi-
dence in government (Della Porta 2000; Anderson and
Tverdova 2003; Bowler and Karp 2004; Redlawsk and
McCann 2005; Cho and Kirwin 2007; Tavits 2008;
Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri 2011). It is also correlated
with a reduction in belief that democracy is effective
(Anderson and Tverdova 2003). Experiences of corrup-
tion have also been shown to reduce trust in govern-
ment officials (Seligson 2002; Anderson and Tverdova
2003; Eek and Rothstein 2009; Morris and Klesner
2010). These effects may be strongest among the poor
(Manzetti and Wilson 2007). Activities that significantly
increase perceptions or experiences of corruption
could, therefore, damage the legitimacy of government,
particularly in new and fragile democracies.
To my knowledge, this is one of the first studies to
examine the relationship between perceptions of corrup-
tion and aid levels at the aggregate sub-national level
rather than employing cross-national comparisons or
in-depth studies of individual projects. This is also the
first study that I am aware of in sub-Saharan Africa that
examines the relationship between aid projects and
the perceptions of corruption of local leaders, rather
than perceptions of the President or national political
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parties. In the next section, I summarize my empirical
approach and afterwards, I report the results of my stat-
istical models and discuss their implications.
Empirical approach
Data sources
This study uses individual- and district-level variables in
its statistical models. Individual-level variables include
outcome measures of perceptions of corruption as well
as socio-demographic control variables that might influ-
ence perceptions of local leaders, personal experience of
corruption in the use of social services, and the amount
of district-level aid. These variables are drawn from
public opinion data collected in the second to fifth
waves of the Afrobarometer survey (Afrobarometer,
2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, and 2014).
The main explanatory variable is aid disbursement per
capita (hereafter ‘aid level’) for the district. Data on aid
disbursements are drawn from the AidData ‘Malawi Aid
Management Platform’ dataset8 (Peratsakis et al. 2012).
It contains geographic information for all external aid
reported to the Malawi Ministry of Finance from 1997
to 2011.9
Main explanatory variable
The amount of aid that a district receives is measured as
the mean USD value of aid disbursements in a district for
four periods that roughly coincide with each Afrobaro-
meter survey round: 2000–2002, 2003–2005, 2006–
2008 and 2009–2011. This figure is then divided by
each project’s duration and each district’s baseline popu-
lation in 1998 and then logged to address the skewness
of the variable.
Outcome variables
The main outcome variable is the perception of corrup-
tion of local leaders. The measure is a recoded categori-
cal variable, based on responses to the survey that
assesses whether respondents thought that none,
some, or all Local Assembly members,10 local govern-
ment officials, religious leaders, traditional leaders, NGO
or CBO leaders, and local service delivery workers were
‘involved in corruption.’ Responses are coded into a
high or low category.11
The other outcome is a variable reporting whether or
not the survey respondent has had an experience paying
a bribe in the last year for obtaining a social service
(water or sanitation services, treatment at local health
facilities, and school placement), obtaining official
documents, or for avoiding problems with the police.
Since evaluations of corruption in local leaders are
heavily influenced by actual experiences of corruption,
I also include bribery as a control variable in the percep-
tion models.
Control variables
I control for the fact that overall perceptions of govern-
ment corruption might drive perceptions of local
leader corruption by including a variable on the level
of perceived Presidential corruption in all models. I also
include a standard battery of demographic controls,
such as gender, age, urban residency, and educational
attainment, in all models to mitigate possible confound-
ing between these variables, aid allocation levels, and
corruption evaluations. All models include an index of
lived poverty because personal economic circumstances
might influence feelings about the government as well
as the probability of receiving aid. Also included are
levels of political interest, media exposure, and closeness
with the President’s political party, which could shape
awareness of, or tolerance for corruption.
I include a measure of group membership, a dichoto-
mous variable that is created by combining responses for
two questions asking whether the respondent is a
member of a religious group, voluntary association, or
a community group. Contact with local patrons is a
recoded dichotomous measure of whether or not the
respondent has contacted a local ‘influential person’ in
the past year with a problem. The local leaders used to
construct the contact measure are contact with local
councilors, NGO/CBO leaders, traditional and religious
leaders. Strength of communitarian beliefs is measured
by how strongly respondents say that they agree to
the first of these two statements: ‘Once in office,
leaders are obliged to help their home community.’ vs.
‘since leaders represent everyone, they should not
favor their own family or group.’
Until the 2009 election, voting behavior and perceptions
of government performance inMalawi followed ethnic and
regional lines closely. I therefore include in most models,
indicators for the four largest ethnic groups consistently
measured by the survey – Yao, Lomwe, Chewa, and
Tumbuka – as well as a residual ‘other’ category.
Finally, I include indicators of existing public goods
provision and overall potential for socio-economic con-
flict within a district, as these factors could confound
relationships between aid levels and corruption (e.g.
areas that have high social tensions may have dimin-
ished ability to attract aid and may be more prone to per-
ceive corruption in local leaders). For public goods
provision, I use a measure of public service availability
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index for the respondent’s census enumeration area. The
potential for conflict is operationalized by the average
ethnic fragmentation in the district and respondents’
perceptions of ethnic discrimination.12 A sense of
ethnic discrimination is measured as the proportion of
respondents who report that their ethnic group is
‘never’ treated unfairly (ethnic group treated fairly).
Non-responses are coded as an undecided third cat-
egory. Also included in the models is a measure of
respondents’ ethnic attachment.
I include the district-level gini coefficient for income in
my models because inequality, interpersonal trust, per-
ceptions of corruption, and income inequality are
hypothesized to be linked. A list of study variables and
the source from where they are obtained are reported
in Table 1 below.
Regression models
The main outcomes examined in this paper are the
answers that survey respondents gave to questions
regarding the degree of corruption that they perceived
in their local leaders, and whether or not they had
recently paid a bribe to receive a social service.
Estimating the impact of aid levels on these outcomes
is complicated by two limitations of the data and study
design. First, Afrobarometer data are cross-sectional, and
may, therefore, be prone to selection bias. Second, there
could be endogeneity inmymodels if aid flows dispropor-
tionately to areas that are predisposed to support the gov-
ernment, or to areas that are relatively less corrupt. To
correct for these potential weaknesses I report two
alternatives to my initial, basic, logistic regression
models, both of which use a two-stage approach.
To correct for potential sample selection bias I use
Stata’s ‘heckprob’ command to fit a Heckman
maximum-likelihood probit model with sample selection.
The Heckman approach allows unobserved factors that
might influence the probability of agreeing to participate
in the survey to be related to unobserved factors that
might affect perceptions and experiences of corruption.
As a second, alternative approach, I use a two-stage
regression model with instrumental variables that
could be related to past aid levels but that should not
be strongly associated with current perceptions or
experiences of corruption. These external instruments
are the average road density (m/km2)13 in a district in
1998, taken from a 2002 International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) poverty mapping dataset and
the baseline 1998 total population in a district from the
same source (Benson et al. 2002). These instruments
are expected to be positively associated with baseline
aid levels because they reflect the geographical conven-
ience of an area to donors and NGOs and the ease of
Table 1. Variables used in the analysis.
Variable
Mean/
Percent Std Deviation Source
Perceptions of Corruption High 79% Afrobarometer Rounds 2–5
District Level Aid (Average per Survey Round) Aid Disbursements Per Capita 2.9 6.68 Malawi Aid Management Platform
Demographics (Age) 18–30 years old 46% Afrobarometer Rounds 2–5
(Age) 31–40 years old 27%
(Age) 41 and older 27%
Male Gender 50%
Secondary Education or More 20%
Urban Residence 16%
Lived Poverty Index 8.76 5.1
Corruption Experiences & Perceptions Perceive President as Corrupt 63%
Have Personal Experience of Corruption 11%
Political Attitudes and Partisanship Political Interest (High) 65%
Voted for the President’s Party 32%
Media Exposure (High/Medium/Low) 71%
Potential for Conflict Ethnic Group Treated Fairly (Yes) 53%
Ethnic Group Treated Fairly (No) 40%
Ethnic Group Treated Fairly (Undecided) 7%
Ethnic Fragmentation in the District 0.190 0.110
Ethnicity Chewa 38%
Tumbuka 10%
Yao 14%
Lomwe 14%
Other 25%
Membership in Patron or Ethnic Networks Contact with Local Patrons 37%
Communitarian Beliefs (High) 43%
Member of Group 68%
Ethnic Attachment (High) 48%
Development Service Availability Index 2.95 1.950 Afrobarometer Rounds 2–5
Income Inequality 0.370 0.0500 Atlas of Social Statistics
Notes: N = 5860 respondents; taken from the Table 2, column 2, Heckman probit selection model estimation sample.
Percentages for some categories may add up to more than 100% due to rounding.
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reaching beneficiaries, both factors that should be posi-
tively associated with the initial allocation of aid resources
to an area (Brass 2012; Briggs 2018). Because I am unsure
of the validity of these instruments, I also attempt to deal
with the potential endogeneity of aid levels using
Lewbel’s (2012) instrumental variable method. Lewbel’s
method creates an internally generated instrument from
the heteroscedasticity present in the data. This internal
instrument can be used on its own in a two-stage
model, or combinedwith external instruments whose val-
idity is suspect, in order to strengthen them. I run external
and internal instrumental variable models using Stata’s
‘ivreg2’ and ‘ivreg2h’ commands respectively.
All models reported (logistic regression, Heckman
probit, and instrumental variable models) include the
demographic and socio-economic covariates discussed in
the previous section, fixed effects for administrative district
(N = 28), and fixed effects for survey round (N = 4). Separate
models are executed that contain aid interactions with
communitarian variables to test whether or not corruption
perceptions differ by strength of communitarian beliefs.
Model performance
Both Heckman and external instrumental variable
models perform well. In the Heckman selection model,
most of the variables in first-stage selection regressions
are statistically significant and, based on the results of
the likelihood-ratio test I can reject the null hypothesis
that the first and second stage of the models are inde-
pendent. This suggests the selection model might have
more consistent and less biased results than a simple
probit or logit model.
The external instruments used in the standard instru-
mental variable model are adequate. In the first-stage
equation, the road density measure is not significant for
either the perception or experience of corruption
models, however, the population variable is significant
in both, at the 5% and 1% level respectively. Post-esti-
mation tests of the instruments suggest that the models
are statistically valid as the instruments perform well on
tests of weak identification and of over- and under-identi-
fication (test results are reported in Tables 2 and 3).
The internally generated instrument models on the
other hand, perform poorly. The method depends on
two important modeling assumptions. The first is hetero-
scedasticity, as the method constructs potentially valid
instruments by multiplying the heteroscedastic residuals
from the first-stage regressions with the model’s exogen-
ous variables. Breusch–Pagan tests suggest that there is
heteroscedasticity in our initial models, so this assump-
tion is met. However, the second assumption, that the
squared residuals of the regression are correlated with
the dependent variable is not met, and when I evaluate
the generated instruments I find that the model fails the
Hansen’s J over-identification test that would indicate
that the internal instruments are exogenous. Because
post-estimation tests suggest that the generated instru-
ments may be weak, I do not use them to augment the
external instruments but rather report them separately.
Regression results
Regression model results are provided in Tables 2–4
below. I report the average marginal effects of the
study variables on the probability of experiencing cor-
ruption or of perceiving local leaders as corrupt for
ease of interpretation.
Hypotheses 1: perceptions of corruption
The findings offer no support for the hypothesis that high
aid levels lead citizens to view local leaders as corrupt. The
relationship between aid levels and perceptions of local
corruption does not reach statistical significance in my
main models (see Table 2).14 In robustness tests that look
at the number of aid projects in a district rather than the
dollar amount of aid, the coefficient on the aid variable is
negative, suggesting that increased aid levels might be
associated with decreased perceptions of corruption (mar-
ginal effect =−0.033, p < 0.05). This observation is contra-
dictory to expectations. The negative trend persists when
weuse alternative outcomemeasures of perceived corrup-
tion such as perception of Presidential corruption, and per-
ception of corruption in all government agencies.
However, higher levels of aid are not associated with
better perceptions of government performance.
The factors that have the strongest and most consist-
ent relationship with perceptions of local leader corrup-
tion are beliefs about Presidential corruption and having
personally experienced corruption by being solicited to
pay a bribe. The strength of the Presidential corruption
variable supports the idea that perceptions about local
leaders are heavily influenced by feelings about the gov-
ernment in general. However, closeness to the Presi-
dent’s party has no significant impact on perceptions
of corruption in these models.
Sensitivity analysis
The fact that the composition of the local leader corrup-
tion outcome measure differs between survey rounds
maybe of some concern, becausewemight bemeasuring
slightly different outcomes in each round of the survey. I
have tested the sensitivity of the results to the use of
different local leaders for the local corruption outcome
variable. The estimates are unstable due to large
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Table 2. Aid and perception of local corruption.
Model 1
(Logistic regression)
Model 2
(Heckman probit)
Model 3
(External instruments)
Model 4
(Generated instruments)
Main Explanatory Variables Second Stage
Mean Aid Per Capita (log) 0.0174 0.009 −0.246 0.009
(0.311) (0.169) (0.363) (0.0421)
Perception Presidential Corruption 2.220** 1.213*** 0.355** 0.357**
(0.109) (0.073) (0.0172) (0.017)
Experience Paying Bribe 0.652** 0.337*** 0.0733** 0.070**
(0.173) (0.088) (0.0167) (0.016)
Strength of Ethnic Attachment 0.174^ 0.078 0.0230^ 0.0215
(0.100) (0.054) (0.0136) (0.013)
Communitarian Feelings 0.0843 0.073 0.0124 0.0146
(0.148) (0.082) (0.0182) (0.018)
Level of Political Interest 0.0173 −0.004 0.00310 0.003
(0.105) (0.059) (0.0134) (0.013)
Media Exposure 0.143 0.081 0.0191 0.020
(0.0933) (0.051) (0.0144) (0.014)
Ethnic Group Treated Fairly (yes) −0.316** −0.171** −0.0440** −0.044**
(0.0999) (0.055) (0.0138) (0.014)
Ethnic Group Treated Fairly (undecided) −0.212 −0.092 −0.0272 −0.024
(0.191) (0.103) (0.0269) (0.026)
Ethnic Fragmentation −0.103 −0.113 −0.0151 −0.009
(0.488) (0.254) (0.0567) (0.056)
Gini Coefficient 0.913 0.393 0.0719 0.096
(2.390) (1.233) (0.299) (0.294)
Demographics First, Selection Stage
31–40 Age Group −0.128 −0.113* −0.0114 −0.015
(0.115) (0.049) (0.0154) (0.014)
41 & Older Age Group −0.215^ −0.245*** −0.0250 −0.027^
(0.116) (0.049) (0.0154) (0.015)
Male Gender −0.0465 0.303*** −0.00663 −0.007
(0.0773) (0.039) (0.0122) (0.012)
Educational Attainment 0.541** 0.311*** 0.0679** 0.065**
(0.140) (0.071) (0.0166) (0.016)
Urban Residency −0.0977 0.073 −0.00167 −0.007
(0.193) (0.078) (0.0325) (0.031)
Index of Lived Poverty 0.0233 0.005 0.000158 0.0002
(0.0295) (0.005) (0.001)
Ethnicity
Yao 0.0478 0.003 0.00226 0.008
(0.187) (0.068) (0.0241) (0.023)
Lomwe 0.00344 0.056 −0.00243 0.002
(0.186) (0.078) (0.0244) (0.023)
Chewa −0.0229 0.015 −0.00623 0.000
(0.158) (0.066) (0.0216) (0.019)
Tumbuka 0.274 0.242** 0.0410 0.043
(0.243) (0.084) (0.0328) (0.033)
Membership in Patron Networks
Patron Contact 0.0234 0.283*** 0.00303 0.004
(0.0920) (0.050) (0.0128) (0.013)
Group Membership −0.158 0.100* −0.0206 −0.020
(0.106) (0.048) (0.0138) (0.014)
Closeness to President’s Party 0.0178 0.421*** 0.00687 0.004
(0.105) (0.053) (0.0138) (0.013)
District Level Development
Service Availability Index 0.0233 0.045** 0.00158 0.003
(0.0295) (0.014) (0.00397) (0.004)
Instrumental Variable Post-estimation Test Results
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 22.053 244.058
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 32.449 244.058
Under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 44.502*** 1464.750***
Over-identification test (Hansen J statistic) 0.859 75.318*
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% IV size 19.93 11.09
Heckman Probit Post-estimation Test Results
Number of censored observations 1040
Number of uncensored observations 4820
Likelihood-ratio test (Independent Equations) (rho = 0): χ2 = 5.96*
Observations 4820 5860 5860 4820
Notes: Marginal effects reported; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for Models 1 and 2 and survey adjusted standard errors are reported in for
Models 3 and 4).
The table reports the marginal effects of each variable on the probability of a survey respondent reporting high corruption in local leaders. In addition to the
variables listed in the table, models also include dummy variables for district and survey round.
^p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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amounts of missing data (>60% of observations missing),
and must be interpreted with caution, but overall, I find a
non-significant trend towards a negative association
between aid levels and perceptions of corruption for
local leaders, particularly for religious, traditional, and
NGO leaders. The significant exception is local govern-
ment officials, for whom aid levels are associated with
an increase in perceptions of corruption (marginal effect
= 0.220, p < 0.001 in the external instrument model).
To examine the discrepancy between the effect of aid
on local governmental and non-governmental leaders, I
grouped aid into NGO- and government-implemented
categories based on project descriptions and titles in
the AidData database, and examined the relationship
between NGO aid levels and perceptions. I find NGO-
implemented aid has negative associations with corrup-
tion perceptions, that in some models reach significance
(marginal effect =−0.022, p < 0.05 in the Heckman selec-
tion model; marginal effect =−.0057, p < 0.05 in the
internal instrument model; marginal effect =−2.855, p
< 0.10 in the logistic regression model).
One could be concerned that the inclusion of the
experience of paying a bribe variable in the perception
models is ‘over controlling’ of perceptions of corruption.
By holding bribery fixed, I am only measuring the change
in the perceptions of corruption that are not based on
the experiences of paying bribes. I run models without
the bribe measure to address this issue. This modification
does not change the magnitude, direction, or signifi-
cance of the estimated impact of aid level on corruption
perceptions, nor does it change the precision of these
estimates. Overall perceptions of corruption continue
to show no statistically significant association with
overall aid levels.
Hypothesis 2: experiences of corruption
When I run models with bribe payment as the outcome, I
find that local aid levels are significantly and positively
associated with having experiences of paying a bribe
for local services (see Table 3). This association occurs
regardless of whether aid is measured in dollar
amounts or project numbers. A 1% increase in aid
levels is associated with a 0.07% to 0.62% increase in
the probability of being solicited to pay a bribe.
However, the subset of NGO-implemented aid displays
the opposite relationship and is negatively associated
with bribe solicitation (see Table 3).
The positive association between aid levels and
experiences of bribe solicitation could result from aid
flowing to more corrupt areas or from aid funding gener-
ating opportunities and incentives for misappropriation
of resources in communities. The greater experience of
bribe solicitation in high aid areas does not translate
into higher perceptions of corruption in those areas,
although with regards to NGO-implemented aid, lower
bribe solicitation and lower corruption perceptions do
coincide. In addition, we do not find that the experience
of bribe solicitation modifies the relationship between
aid and corruption perceptions.
Table 3. Aid and experience of bribery.
Aid and experience of bribery
Model 1
(Logistic regression)
Model 2
(Heckman probit)
Model 3
(External instruments)
Model 4
(Generated instruments)
Aid Per Capita (log) 0.684^
(0.352)
0.386*
(0.189)
0.619**
(0.233)
0.065*
(0.032)
Instrumental Variable Post-estimation Test Results
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 48.70 292.41
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 68.013 244.058
Under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 97.058*** 1801.55***
Over-identification test (Hansen J statistic) 1.261 82.349**
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% IV size 19.93 11.09
Heckman Probit Post-estimation Test Results
Number of censored observations 222
Number of uncensored observations 5,596
Likelihood-ratio test (Independent Equations) (rho = 0): χ2 = 3.80^
Observations 5818 5810 5810
Alternative Aid Specificationsa
Number of Projects Per Capita (1000) 0.112**
(0.0380)
0.443**
(0.103)
1.893*
(0.779)
0.849**
(0.202)
Relative Number of Projects Per Capita (log) 4.368**
(1.161)
2.402**
(0.611)
3.428**
(1.228)
4.642**
(1.158)
NGO Implemented Aid (log) −0.0555*
(0.0222)
−2.655***
(0.775)
−0.084*
(0.034)
−0.449**
(0.157)
Notes: Marginal effects reported; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for Models 1 and 2 and survey adjusted standard errors are reported in for
Models 3 and 4).
The table reports the marginal effects of aid on the probability of survey respondents reporting that they have had to pay a bribe in the past year. Included in the
models are all of the covariates listed above in Table 2, except bribe payments. This includes fixed effects for district and survey round.
^p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
aExternal instruments passed tests of weak instruments, under- and over-identification.
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Hypotheses 3 and 4: aid, communitarian beliefs,
and corruption perceptions
My findings offer no support for the proposition that
those who hold communitarian feelings view the corrup-
tion resulting from aid projects differently than those
who place less value on sharing and equity. Those who
hold communitarian feelings are neither more nor less
likely to perceive corruption in their local leaders for a
given level of aid regardless of how aid is measured
(see Table 4).
Discussion
The study finds no consistent, significant positive
relationship between aid levels and citizen perceptions
of corruption among local leaders. To the extent that
aid is a statistically significant factor in the models
tested, it usually displays a negative relationship with
corruption perceptions. In other words, higher levels
of aid activity, particularly NGO-implemented activity,
may be associated with reduced perceptions of corrup-
tion. This unexpected result may be due to the percep-
tion of the provision of aid resources as a sign of local
government fairness and effectiveness. If this is true,
the actual level of misappropriation in aid projects
may be less important in driving perceptions of corrup-
tion than the symbolic presence of these projects in the
community.
Despite the absence of a consistent association with
perceived corruption, aid levels were significantly and
positively associated with more reports of experienced
corruption in the form of bribe solicitation. This discre-
pancy is in keeping with other studies that have found
that the perception and true prevalence of corruption
may be only loosely associated (Seligson 2002; Seligson
2006; Treisman 2007; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud
2010; Rose and Mishler 2010). In my study, this weak
link between perceptions and experience could be
explained if perceptions of corruption are an indicator
of general perceptions of overall government perform-
ance rather than an indicator of actual corruption in
the community.15 Higher-level concerns about govern-
ment performance and government corruption might
be unaffected by the relatively minor resource misappro-
priation that aid projects produce at the local level.
Another possible explanation for the trend in the data
towards a negative trend in the relationship between aid
projects and corruption perceptions (and the outlying sig-
nificant association between aid levels and negative cor-
ruption perceptions for local government officials) has to
do with differences in corruption between government-
implemented and NGO-implemented projects. My
bribery findings indicate that corruption in NGO-
implemented services is less severe than corruption in
government services. The fact that so much aid in
Malawi is channeled through NGOs could dampen the
association between aid andpoor corruption perceptions.
Another possible explanation for the observed nega-
tive association between the number of aid projects in
a district and perceived corruption, (and for the obser-
vation that aid activity might increase the prevalence
of corruption but not the perception of its prevalence)
might be that misappropriated aid resources are widely
distributed and shared within patron-client networks
(katangale) so that citizens do not associate aid projects
with ‘corruption’ but as rather its opposite: a morally
sanctioned, reciprocal sharing of resources. This could
also explain why only local government officials, in con-
trast to other, more socially embedded and better mon-
itored local leaders, buck the trend for a negative
relationship between higher perceived corruption and
higher aid levels. This interpretation is called into ques-
tion by the observation that the indicator of communal
solidarity does not significantly affect the association
between aid levels and perceptions of corruption.
Finally, the difference between bribe solicitation and
perceptions of corruption could be explained if paying
small bribes to receive services were not categorized as
an exceptional circumstance by individuals but rather
as a normal part of doing business and receiving social
services. If such solicitation is an entrenched part of
Malawi’s social service system, it would be logical that
such solicitation would increase along with increases in
the provision of social services that aid resources bring
about. By increasing the availability of social services,
aid would create more opportunities for bribery solicita-
tion, particularly in government facilities.16
Concluding remarks
Studies of the local political impact of individual aid pro-
grams are almost unanimous in finding that aid projects
Table 4. Aid and perceptions of local corruption: interaction.
Perceived local corruption External instrument model
Mean Aid Per Capita (log) per district-year −0.317
(0.446)
Communitarian Values −0.0434
(0.0901)
Aid & Comm. Values 0.209
(0.316)
Notes: Marginal effects reported; robust standard errors in parentheses.
The table reports the marginal effects of each variable on the probability of a
survey respondent reporting high corruption in local leaders. Included in
the models are all of the covariates listed above in Table 2 including
fixed effects for district and survey round. External instruments passed
tests of weak instruments, under- and over-identification.
^p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, N = 4820.
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support patronage structures and reinforce local power
dynamics. The increasing worry voiced by those con-
cerned with aid effectiveness is that these projects
might cumulatively retard political development by
strengthening local leaders and by reducing incentives
for them to act accountably. The results from this study
do little to allay these fears. The strong positive associ-
ation between aid levels and the experience of corrup-
tion suggests that aid resources might feed into
existing patron-client resource distribution networks
and erode support for local government officials. Our
findings do, however, support the contention that chan-
neling aid through NGOs might mitigate these negative
effects of aid.
In regards to future studies, additional research on
sector- and donor-specific differences in the relationship
between aid levels and corruption would be valuable, as
would the replication of this study in other sub-Saharan
African countries for which data on sub-national aid
flows are becoming available. More scholarship from
Malawians themselves on their perceptions of aid and
corruption would also be welcome.
Notes
1. Throughout the paper I employ the standard definition
of ‘corruption’ to mean the abuse of public office for
private gain (World Bank/IMF 2007).
2. This is mostly the case for bilateral donors. Multilateral
donors, being somewhat sheltered from these pressures,
may have a greater incentive to monitor projects. There
is some indication that multilateral aid may have a differ-
ent impact on corruption than bilateral aid (Charron
2011).
3. They are however at odds with Olken’s study (2009)
which found that villagers’ perceptions of corruption
were highly and positively correlated with a measure of
the actual amount of corruption in the project.
4. Such networks are particularly important in times of
economic uncertainty when they serve as safety nets
and a way to pool resources. Malawi’s post-transition
period with its rapid urbanization and reoccurring econ-
omic crises might be considered a period during which
these networks would have been particularly important.
5. The usage of the term katangale may have shifted over
time, as, contrary to Anders, I find that in current
popular media and online discussions, katangale is
always referred to negatively to describe a general
state corruption, while kuba is used to describe particular
episodes of theft resulting from katangale. The changing
usage could also reflect a decreasing tolerance of katan-
gale although it should be noted that while public
opinion surveys show that the vast majority of Malawians
reject the notion that leaders should ‘help their own
community’ the proportion of respondents who agree
with that statement has been growing, not declining
over time (Afrobarometer 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, and
2014).
6. Smith’s work also suggests that the invocation of norms
of reciprocity in resource allocation may be used as a cri-
tique of personal enrichment at public expense and of
the inequality it breeds. In other words, nuanced and
ambivalent attitudes towards katangale may not reflect
intransigent, static ‘traditional’ beliefs, but rather dissatis-
faction with, and reaction to, the economic displacement
brought about by globalization, systematic graft, and
political closure.
7. See Yang 2002 for an interesting discussion along these
lines regarding guanxi in China.
8. The dataset is publically available at http://www.aiddata.
org/content/index/AidData-Raw/geocoded-data
9. Projects before 2000 were not exhaustively catalogued
so the database is only considered complete for the
2000–2011 time period.
10. The Local Assembly is Malawi’s district-level legislative
body.
11. The survey question was ‘How many of the following
people do you think are involved in corruption, or
haven’t you heard enough about them to say:__?’ It is
coded as a 0 if the respondent says ‘none’ or ‘some of
them’, 1 if the respondent says ‘most of them’, or ‘all of
them’. Don’t know and non-responses were dropped
from the analysis. Responses about the following local
patrons are included in the measure: local councilors
(all rounds), traditional leaders (rounds 4 and 2 only), reli-
gious leaders (round 2 only), NGO or CBO leaders (rounds
2 and 5), and local service providers (round 3 only).
12. Ethnic fractionalization is measured by a Herfindahl-
Hirschman index for the number of different ethnic
groups in each district in each survey round. I create
the variable using Stata’s user-generated ‘hhi’
command (Ansari 2012).
13. This is the average meters of road per 100 sq. km of land
area weighted by the ‘potential speed on different qual-
ities of road’ and deflated population size.
14. Aid also has no statistically significant impact on per-
ceived Presidential corruption, perceived overall govern-
ment corruption or on perceptions of local government
or Presidential performance.
15. Local government performance evaluations and local
leader corruption measures are significantly (although
weakly) correlated in this study (r =−0.06, p-value < 0.001).
16. My thanks to Shana Warren for this suggestion.
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